Quantum Probability from Subjective Likelihood: improving on Deutsch's proof of the probability rule by Wallace, David
Quantum Probability from Subjective Likelihood:
improving on Deutsch’s proof of the probability
rule
David Wallace
19th September 2003
Abstract
I present a proof of the quantum probability rule from decision-theoretic
assumptions, in the context of the Everett interpretation. The basic ideas
behind the proof are those presented in Deutsch’s recent proof of the prob-
ability rule, but the proof is simpler and proceeds from weaker decision-
theoretic assumptions. This makes it easier to discuss the conceptual ideas
involved in the proof, and to show that they are defensible.
1 Introduction
The mathematical formalism of the quantum theory is capable of
yielding its own interpretation.
Bryce DeWitt (1970)
If I were to pick one theme as central to the tangled development of the
Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, it would probably be: the for-
malism is to be left alone. What distinguished Everett’s original paper both
from the Dirac-von Neumann collapse-of-the-wavefunction orthodoxy and from
contemporary rivals such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory was its insistence that
unitary quantum mechanics need not be supplemented in any way (whether by
hidden variables, by new dynamical processes, or whatever).
Many commentators on the Everett interpretation — even some, like David
Deutsch, who are sympathetic to it (Deutsch 1985) — have at various points
and for various reasons retreated from this claim.1 The “preferred basis prob-
lem”, for instance, has induced many to suppose that quantum mechanics must
be supplemented by some explicit rule that picks out one basis as physically
special. Many suggestions were made for such a rule (Barrett (1999) discusses
1It is perhaps worth noting that Deutsch no longer sees any need to modify the formalism,
and is now happy with a decoherence-based solution to the preferred-basis problem.
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several); all seem to undermine the elegance (and perhaps more crucially, the
relativistic covariance) of Everett’s original proposal. Now the rise of decoher-
ence theory has produced a broad consensus among supporters of Everett (in
physics, if perhaps not yet in philosophy) that the supplementation was after
all not necessary. (For more details of this story, see Wallace (2002b, 2003a)
and references therein.)
Similarly, various commentators (notably Bell (1981), Butterfield (1996) and
Albert and Loewer (1988)) have suggested that the Everett interpretation has
a problem with persistence of objects (particles, cats, people, . . . ) over time,
and some have been motivated to add explicit structure to quantum mechanics
in order to account for this persistence (in particular, this is a prime motivation
for Albert and Loewer’s original Many-Minds theory). Such moves again under-
mine the rationale for an Everett-type interpretation. And again, a response to
such criticism which does not require changes to the formalism was eventually
forthcoming. It was perhaps implicit in Everett’s original discussion of observer
memory states, and in Gell-Mann and Hartle’s later notion of IGUSs (Gell-
Mann and Hartle 1990); it has been made explicit by Simon Saunders’ work
(Saunders 1998) on the analogy between Everettian branching and Parfittian
fission.
In both these cases, my point is not that the critics were foolish or mistaken:
Everettians were indeed obliged to come up with solutions both to the preferred-
basis problem and to the problem of identity over time. However, in both cases
the obvious temptation — to modify the formalism so as to solve the problem
by fiat — has proved to be unnecessary: it has been possible to find solutions
within the existing theory, and thus to preserve those features of the Everett
interpretation which made it attractive in the first place.
Something similar may be going on with the other major problem of the
Everett interpretation: that of understanding quantitative probability. One of
the most telling criticisms levelled at Everettians by their critics has always been
their inability to explain why, when all outcomes objectively occur, we should
regard one as more likely than the other. The problem is not merely how such
talk of probability can be meaningful; it is also how the specific probability rule
used in quantum mechanics is to be justified in an Everettian context. Here too,
the temptation is strong to modify the formalism so as to include the probability
rule as an explicit extra postulate.
Here too, it may not be necessary. David Deutsch has, I believe, trans-
formed the debate by attempting (Deutsch 1999) to derive the probability rule
within unitary quantum mechanics, via considerations of rationality (formalised
in decision-theoretic terms). His work has not so far met with wide acceptance,
perhaps in part because it does not make it at all obvious that the Everett in-
terpretation is central (and his proof manifestly fails without that assumption).
In Wallace (2003b), I have presented an exegesis of Deutsch’s proof in which
the Everettian assumptions are made explicit. The present paper may be seen
as complementary to my previous paper: it presents an argument in the spirit
of Deutsch’s, but rather different in detail. My reasons for this are two-fold:
firstly, I hope to show that the mathematics of Deutsch’s proof can be substan-
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tially simplified, and his decision-theoretic axioms greatly weakened; secondly
and perhaps more importantly, by simplifying the mathematical structure of the
proof, I hope to be able to give as clear as possible a discussion of the conceptual
assumptions and processes involved in the proof. In this way I hope that the
reader may be in a better position to judge whether or not the probability prob-
lem, like other problems before it, can indeed be solved without modifications
to the quantum formalism.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 I review the account
of branching that Everettians must give, and distinguish two rather different
viewpoints that are available to them; in section 3 I consider how probability
might fit into such an account. Sections 4–5 are the mathematical core of the
paper: they present an extremely minimal set of decision-theoretic assumptions
and show how, in combination with an assumption which I call equivalence,
they are sufficient to derive the quantum probability rule. The next three sec-
tions are a detailed examination of this postulate of equivalence. I argue that
it is unacceptable as a principle of rationality for single-universe interpretations
(section 6), but is fully defensible for Everettians — either via the sort of ar-
guments used by Deutsch (section 7) or directly (section 8). Section 9 is the
conclusion.
2 Thinking about branching
The conceptual problem posed by branching is essentially one of transtemporal
identity: given branching events in my future, how can it even make sense for me
to say things like “I will experience such-and-such”? Sure, the theory predicts
that people who look like me will have these experiences, but what experiences
will I have? Absent some rule to specify which of these people is me, the only
options seem to be (1) that I’m all of them, in which case I will presumably have
all of their experiences, or (2) that I’m none of them, which seems to suggest
that branching events are fatal to me.
As Saunders (1998) has forcefully argued, this is a false dilemma. Even in
classical physics, it is a commonplace to suppose that transtemporal identity
claims, far from being in some sense primitive, supervene on structural and
causal relations between momentary regions of spacetime. Furthermore, the
work of Parfit (1984) and others on fission, teletransportation and the like has
given us reason to doubt that identity per se is what is important to us: rather,
it is the survival of people who are appropriately (causally/structurally) related
to me that is important, notmy survival per se. In a branching event, then, what
is important is that the post-branching people do indeed bear these relations
to me. That I care about their future well-being is no more mysterious than —
indeed, is precisely analogous to — my caring about my own future well-being.
If this resolves the paradox, still it leaves a choice of ways for Everettians to
think about splitting (which is the reason for this section). The choice has not
been discussed much in print (though seeGreaves 2003 and Wallace 2002a), but
it often arises in informal discussions and is of some relevance to the rest of this
3
paper. The two options are:
• The Subjective-uncertainty (SU) viewpoint: Given that what it is to have
a future self is to be appropriately related to a certain future person, and
that in normal circumstances I expect to become my future self, so also in
Everettian splittings I should expect to become one of my future selves.
If there is more than one of them I should be uncertain as to which I will
become; furthermore, this subjective uncertainty is compatible with my
total knowledge of the wavefunction and its dynamics. (This is Saunders’
own view, argued for at length in Saunders 1998.)
• The Objective-determinism (OD) viewpoint: It is just incoherent to have
perfect knowledge of the future and yet be uncertain about it, so the
correct attitude to branching is complete certainty. However, rationally
speaking I should act to benefit my future descendants, for exactly the
same reason that people in non-branching possible worlds would act to
benefit their single descendant. Likewise, talk of ‘expectations’ is to be re-
jected, except in a third-party sense: I might expect that, post-branching,
there will be many copies of me, but it is simply mistaken for me to expect
that I will have one experience rather than another. (This is perhaps the
most literal translation of Parfit’s own ideas into a quantum-mechanical
context; it appears to be the view espoused by Bostrom (2002) in his dis-
cussion of the Everett interpretation, and is defended explicitly by Greaves
(2003).)
I have my own preference between these options (it’s for the SU viewpoint, for
the record), but I don’t intend to defend it here. I do, however, feel that the
distinction is genuine and is of some importance (if perhaps for philosophers
rather than physicists). In particular, the SU viewpoint is in some ways sub-
stantially more conservative than its rival: according to the OD viewpoint, in
wondering aloud what result a measurement is about to give I am talking non-
sense, whereas such talk is perfectly reasonable from the SU viewpoint (even if
its metaphysical basis is not what one might have expected).
I will return to these matters in sections 7–8. For now, however, let us move
from the question of identity to the question of probability.
3 Weight and probability
The paradigm of a quantum measurement is something like this: prepare a
system (represented by a Hilbert space H) in some state (represented by a
normalised vector |ψ〉 in H). Carry out some measurement process (represented
by a discrete-spectrum self-adjoint operator X̂ over H) on the system, and
look to see what result (represented by some element of the spectrum of X̂) is
obtained.
Suppose some such measurement process is denoted by M , and suppose
that associated with M is some set SM of possible outcomes of the process (for
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instance, states of the apparatus with pointers pointing in certain directions.)
Let us call this the state space of the measurement process; and let us call EM ,
the set of all subsets of SM , the event space for M . We define the total event
space for a set of measurements as the union of all their event spaces.
If the observable being measured is represented by operator X̂, then speci-
fying the measurement process requires us to specify some convention by which
elements of SM are associated with elements of the spectrum σ(X̂) of eigen-
values of X̂. In effect, the convention is a function C from SM onto σ(X̂):
C(s) is the outcome which we associate with state s (and C(E) is shorthand for
{C(s)|s ∈ E}).
Now, suppose that the system being measured is in state |ψ〉. We use it,
and C, to define a weight function on EM , as follows:
WM (E) =
∑
x∈C(E)
〈ψ| P̂X(x) |ψ〉 ∀E ⊆M, (1)
where P̂X(x) projects onto the eigenspace of X̂ with eigenvalue x.
All this should be both familiar and essentially interpretation-neutral; fa-
miliar, too, should be the
Quantum probability rule: IfM is a quantum measurement and
E ∈ EM , then the probability of E given that M is performed is
equal to WM (E).
Familiar though it may be, do we actually understand it? Compare it with
the
Quantum sqwerdleflunkicity rule: If M is a quantum measure-
ment and E ∈ EM , then the sqwerdleflunkicity of E given that M is
performed is equal to WM (E).
We don’t understand the quantum sqwerdleflunkicity rule, and for an obvious
reason: “sqwerdleflunkicity” is meaningless, or at any rate we have no idea what
it is supposed to mean. So if we do understand the quantum probability rule,
presumably this requires that we understand what “probability” means.
But in fact, the meaning of “probability” is pretty subtle, and pretty contro-
versial. In practice, physicists tend to test “probability” statements by relating
them to observed frequencies, and as a result most physicists tend to define
probability as relative frequency in the limit. This is also the notion of proba-
bility used by most investigators of the Everett interpretation, beginning with
Everett’s own analysis of memory traces under repeated measurements and lead-
ing to the elegant relative-frequency theorems established by Hartle (1968) and
Farhi, Goldstone, and Gutmann (). The general strategy of these investigations
is to show that as we approach the limiting case of infinitely many measure-
ments, the weights of those branches in which relative frequencies are anoma-
lous approach zero (or alternatively that in mathematical models appropriate
to an actual infinity of measurements, there are no branches with anomalous
frequencies.)
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Such arguments have in general failed to convince sceptics. Arguably they
either invoke unphysical situations such as an actual infinity of experiments, or
they court circularity: if we wish to prove that the quantum weight function is
something to do with probability, we aren’t entitled to assume that anomalous
branches can be neglected just because they have very low weight.
Now, anyone familiar with the chequered history of frequentist theories of
probability should feel uneasy at this point: virtually identical criticisms could
easily be levelled at the frequentist definition of probability itself. For that
definition, too, either makes use of infinite ensembles or runs into the problem
that anomalous frequencies are just very improbable, not actually impossible. It
is most unclear that Everettian frequentists are any worse off than other species
of frequentist.
Nevertheless, if Everettians have an incoherent theory of probability it is
cold comfort for them if other people do too. Is there a more positive step
that they can make? They could simply take probability as primitive, and
declare it to be an interpretative posit that probability=weight; at one point
this was Simon Saunders’ strategy (see (Saunders 1998)), and he has defended
(successfully, in my view) the position that non-Everettian theories of physics do
no better. Again, though, this seems unsatisfactory: we would like to understand
Everettian probability, not just observe that non-Everettians also have problems
with probability.2
To the best of my knowledge, Deutsch (1999) made the first concrete non-
frequentist proposal for how probabilities could be derived in the Everett inter-
pretation . His strategy follows in the footsteps of the subjectivist tradition in
foundations of probability, originally developed by Ramsey (1931), de Finetti
(1974), Savage (1972) and others: instead of reducing probability to frequencies,
operationalise it by reducing it to the preferences of rational agents. We might
then say that one such agent judges E more likely than F iff that agent would
prefer a bet on E to a bet on F (for the same stake); we could similarly say
that E is more likely than F simpliciter if all agents are rationally compelled
to prefer bets on E to bets on F .
In principle, we might go further. An agent judges E and F to be equally
likely iff he is indifferent between a bet on E and one on F ; if he judges disjoint
events E and F to be equally likely, and judges G to be equally likely as E ∪F ,
then we say that he judges G to be twice as likely as E. By this sort of strategy,
we can justify not just qualitative but quantitative comparisons of likelihood,
and— perhaps — ultimately work up towards a numerical measure of likelihood:
that is, a numerical probability.
The strategy of the subjectivists, then, was this: to state intuitively reason-
able axioms for rational preference, such that if an agent’s preferences conform
to those axioms then they are provably required to be given by some probability
function. Deutsch essentially takes this strategy over to quantum mechanics: he
2Having said which, if no-one has a good theory of probability then it would be unrea-
sonable to dismiss the Everett interpretation in favour of other interpretations purely on the
grounds of the probability problem; see Papineau (1996) for a more detailed presentation of
this argument.
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uses the operationalist notion of probability not only to make sense of proba-
bilistic talk within the Everett interpretation, but also to prove that the rational
agents must use the weight function W of equation (1) to determine probabili-
ties.
4 A rudimentary decision theory
In this section I will develop some of the formal details of the subjectivist pro-
gram, in a context which will allow ready application to quantum theory. Our
starting point is the following: define a likelihood ordering as some two-place
relation holding between ordered pairs 〈E,M〉, whereM is a quantum measure-
ment and E is an event in EM (that is, E is a subset of the possible outcomes
of the measurement). We write the relation as :
E|M  F |N (2)
is then to be read as “It’s at least as likely that some outcome in E will obtain
(given that measurement M is carried out) as it is that some outcome in F
will obtain (given that measurement N is carried out)”. We define ' and 
as follows: E|M ' F |N if E|M  F |N and F |N  E|M ; E|M  F |N if
E|M  F |N but E|M '/F |N . We define  and ≺ in the obvious way, as the
inverses of  and  respectively.
We will say that such an ordering is represented by a function Pr from pairs
〈E,M〉 to the reals if
1. Pr(∅|M) = 0, and Pr(SM |M) = 1, for each M .
2. If E and F are disjoint then Pr(E ∪ F |M) = Pr(E|M) + Pr(F |M).
3. Pr(E|M) ≥ Pr(F |N) iff E|M  F |N .
The ordering is uniquely represented iff there is only one such Pr.
The subjectivist program then seeks to find axioms for  so that any agent’s
preferences are uniquely represented. Literally dozens of sets of such axioms
have been proposed over the years (see Fishburn (1981) for a review). Their
forms vary widely, but as a rule there is an inverse correlation between the
complexity of the axioms and their individual plausibility. Deutsch, for instance,
uses a fairly simple but implausibly strong set of axioms (which I reconstruct
in Wallace 2003b).
However, in a quantum-mechanical context we can manage with a set of
axioms which is both extremely weak — far weaker than Deutsch’s set — and
fairly simple. To state them, it will be convenient to define a null event : an
event E is null with respect to M (or, equivalently, E|M is null) iff E|M ' ∅|M .
(That is: E is certain not to happen, given M). If it is clear which M we’re
referring to, we will sometimes drop the M and refer to E as null simpliciter.
We can then say that a likelihood ordering is minimally rational if it satisfies
the following axioms:
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Transitivity  is transitive: if E|M  F |N and F |N  G|O, then E|M 
G|O.
Separation There exists some E and M such that E|M is not null.
Inclusion If E ⊆ F , then F |M  E|M for any M .
Null additivity An event E ∈ EM is null iff, for any event F ∈ EM , E∪F |M '
E|M .
This is an extremely weak set of axioms for qualitative likelihood (far weaker,
for instance, than the standard de Finetti axioms — see de Finetti 1974). Each,
translated into words, should be immediately intuitive:
1. Transitivity: ‘If A is at least as likely than B and B is at least as likely
than C, then A is at least as likely than C.’
2. Separation: ‘There is some outcome that is not impossible.’
3. Inclusion: ‘An event doesn’t get less likely just because more outcomes
are added to it.’
4. Null additivity: ‘A set of outcomes is impossible iff adding them to any
event doesn’t make that event any likelier.’
5 A quantum representation theorem
It goes without saying that this set of axioms alone is insufficient to derive
the quantum probability rule: absolutely no connection has yet been made
between the decision-theoretic axioms and quantum theory. We can make this
connection, however, via two further posits. Firstly, we need to assume that we
have a fairly rich set of quantum measurements available to us: rich, in fact, in
the sense of the following definition.
Weight richness: A set M of quantum measurements is rich pro-
vided that, for any positive real numbers w1, . . . wn with
∑n
i=1 =
1, M includes a quantum measurement with n outcomes having
weights w1, . . . , wn.
The richness of a set of measurements is an easy consequence of the follow-
ing (slightly informal) principle: that for any n there exists at least one system
whose Hilbert space has dimension n such that that system can be prepared
in any state and that at least one non-degenerate observable can be measured
on that system. Clearly, this is an idealisation: with sufficiently high compu-
tational power we can prepare states with arbitrary accuracy, but presumably
there is some limit to that power in a finite universe. However, it seems a reason-
able idealisation (just as it is reasonable to idealise the theory of computations
slightly, abstracting away the fact that in practice the finitude of the universe
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puts an upper limit on a computer’s memory) and I will assume it without
further discussion.
Far more contentious is the second principle which we must assume:
Equivalence If E and F are events andWM (E) =WN (F ), then E|M ' F |N .
Much of the rest of the paper will be devoted to an analysis of whether equiv-
alence is a legitimate requirement for rational agents. But the point of such
an analysis, of course, is that in the decision-theoretic context which we are
analysing, a great deal can be proved from it. In fact, we are now in a position
to prove the
Quantum Representation Theorem: Suppose that  is a minimally ratio-
nal likelihood order for a rich set of quantum measurements, and suppose
that  satisfies equivalence. Then  is uniquely represented by the
probability measure Pr(E|M) =WM (E).
Proof: We proceed via a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1 If WM (E) ≥ WN (F ), then E|M  F |N .
Since the set of quantum measurements is rich, there exists a quantum measure-
ment O with disjoint events G,H such that WO(G) = WN (F ) and WO(H) =
WM (E) − WN (F ). By equivalence E|M ' G ∪ HO and G|O ' F |N ; by
inclusion G ∪H|O  G|O; by transitivity it then follows that E|M  F |N .
Lemma 2 A quantum event is null iff it has weight zero.
That weight-zero events are null follows from equivalence and WM (∅) = 0.
For the converse, suppose for contradiction that some event of weight w > 0
is null; then there must exist n such that 1/n < w. By lemma 1, any event
of weight 1/n must also be null. Since the set of measurements is rich, there
exists a quantum measurement M with n outcomes all of weight 1/n: all must
be null, and so by repeated use of null additivity so must SM . By lemma 1
we conclude that all events are null, in contradiction with separation.
Lemma 3 If E|M  F |N , then WM (E) ≥ WN (F ).
Suppose that WM (E) < WN (F ). The set of measurements is rich, so there
exists a quantum measurement O with disjoint events G,H such thatWO(G) =
WM (E) andWO(H) =WN (F )−WM (E). If E|M  F |N then G|O  G∪H|O,
which by inclusion is possible only if H is null. But since WO(H) > 0, by
lemma 2 H '/ ∅.
Lemmas 1 and 3 jointly prove that W represents . To show that the rep-
resentation is unique, suppose M is any quantum measurement with outcomes
having weights k1/K, k2/K, . . . kN/K, where k1 through kn are positive inte-
gers whose sum is K. Since the set of measurements is rich, there exists another
measurementM ′ with K possible outcomes each having weight 1/K. Since each
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is equiprobable, any probability function representing  must assign probability
1/K to each outcome. Let E1 be the union of the first k1 outcomes of M ′, E2
be the union of the next k2 outcomes, and so on; then any probability func-
tion must assign probability ki/K to Ei|M ′, and hence (since they have equal
weight) to the ith outcome of M .
So: any probability function must agree with the weight function on rational-
weight events. But since any irrational-weight event is more likely than all ratio-
nal weight events with lower weight and less likely than all rational weight events
with higher weight, agreement on rational values is enough to force agreement
on all values.2
6 Equivalence and the single universe
So far, so good. The “decision-theoretic turn” suggested by Deutsch not only
allows us to make sense of probability in an Everettian universe, but it also
allows us to derive the quantitative form of the probability rule from assumptions
— equivalence and the richness of the set of measurements — which prima
facie are substantially weaker than the rule itself.
Nonetheless the situation remains unsatisfactory. Equivalence has the form
of a principle of pure rationality: it dictates that any agent who does not re-
gard equally-weighted events as equally likely is in some sense being irrational.
Whether this principle is simple, or “prima facie weak”, is not the point: the
point is whether it is defensible purely from considerations of rationality. Sim-
plicity might be a virtue when we are considering which axioms of fundamental
physics to adopt, but can our “axioms of fundamental physics” include state-
ments which speak directly of rationality? Surely not.
In fact, I believe that equivalence can be defended on grounds of pure
rationality, and need not be regarded as a new physical axiom; I shall spend
sections 7—8 providing such a defence. However, before doing so I wish to
argue that the Everett interpretation necessarily plays a central role in any such
defence: in other interpretations, equivalence is not only unmotivated as a
rationality principle but is actually absurd.3
Why? Observe what equivalence actually claims: that if we know that
two events have the same weight, then we must regard them as equally likely
regardless of any other information we may have about them. Put another way,
if we wish to determine which event to bet on and we are told that they have
the same weight, we will be uninterested in any other information about them.
But in any interpretation which does not involve branching — that is, in
any non-Everettian interpretation — there is a further piece of information that
3In this section I confine my observations to those interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics which are in some sense “realist” and observer-independent (such as collapse theories or
hidden-variable theories). I will not consider interpretations (such as the Copenhagen in-
terpretation, or the recent variant defended by Fuchs and Peres 2000) which take a more
‘operationalist’ approach to the quantum formalism. It is entirely possible, as has been ar-
gued recently by Saunders (2003), that an approach based on Deutsch’s proof may be useful
in these interpretations.
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cannot but be relevant to our choice: namely, which event is actually going to
happen? If in fact we know that E rather than F will actually occur, of course
we will bet on E, regardless of the relative weights of the events.
This objection can be made precise in one of two ways. The first might be
called the argument from fatalism, and presumes a B-theoretic (or indexical, or
‘block-universe’) view of time: that from God’s perspective there is no difference
between past, present and future. If this is the case, then there is a fact of
the matter (regardless of whether the world is deterministic) as to which future
event occurs. Maybe this fact is epistemically inaccessible to us even in principle;
nonetheless if we knew it, of course it would influence our bets.
Maybe you don’t like the B-theoretic view of time; or maybe you see some-
thing objectionable in appeal to in-principle-inaccessible facts. Then I commend
to your attention the second way of making the objection precise: the argument
from determinism. Suppose, for the moment, that quantum theory is deter-
ministic and non-branching: for instance, it might be the de Broglie-Bohm
pilot-wave theory, or some other deterministic hidden-variables theory). Then a
sufficiently complete description of the microstate will determine exactly which
event will occur, regardless of weights; again, if we had this complete description
it would certainly influence (indeed, fix) our preferences between bets.
(Maybe certain details of the microstate are “in principle inaccessible”, as is
arguably the case in the pilot-wave theory. This doesn’t improve matters: for
the theory to have any predictive power at all we need to say something about
the hidden variables, and in practice we need to give a probability distribution
over them. Well, “hidden variables are randomly distributed in such-and-such
a way” might be a reasonable law of physics, but absent such a law, there
seems no justification at all for adopting “it is rational to assume such-and-such
distribution of hidden variables”.)
What if quantum theory is indeterministic? Again, if the theory is to have
predictive power then we must replace deterministic evolution with something
else: a stochastic dynamics. In this case, it only makes sense to adopt equiva-
lence if the stochastic dynamics makes equal-weighted events equiprobable —
and as Barnum et al (2000) have pointed out in their discussion of Deutsch’s
work, there is no difficulty in constructing a stochastic dynamics for quantum
mechanics which does no such thing.
The reason that the Everett interpretation is not troubled by these problems
is simple. Regardless of our theories of time, and notwithstanding the deter-
minism of her theory, for the Everettian there is simply no fact of the matter
which measurement outcome will occur, and so it is not just impossible, but
incoherent for an agent to know this fact. This coexistence of determinism with
the in-principle-unknowability of the future is from a philosophical point of view
perhaps the Everett interpretation’s most intriguing feature.
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7 Equivalence via measurement neutrality
If we have shown that equivalence is implausible except in the Everett in-
terpretation, still we have not shown that it is plausible for Everettians; that
is our next task. An obvious starting point is Deutsch’s original work; but
Deutsch makes no direct use of equivalence. Instead, he uses — implicitly,
but extensively — a principle which I have elsewhere (Wallace 2003b) called
measurement neutrality: the principle that once we have specified which
system is being measured, which state that system is being prepared in, and
which observable is being measured on it, then we have specified everything that
we need to know for decision-making purposes. In this section I will show how
measurement neutrality is sufficient to establish equivalence, and discuss
whethermeasurement neutrality is itself justifiable; in the next section I will
look at more direct arguments for equivalence.
In effect, assuming measurement neutrality allows us to replace the ab-
stract set M of measurements with the set of triples 〈H, |ψ〉 , X̂〉, and the ab-
stract set SM of outcomes of the measurement with the spectrum σ(X̂) of X̂.
The relation  is similarly transferred from ordered pairs 〈E,M〉 to ordered
quadruples 〈E,H, |ψ〉 , X̂〉 (where E ⊆ σ(X̂) is now just a subset of <).
From a purely mathematical point of view, this move clearly gets us no closer
to deriving equivalence (and, thus, the quantum representation theorem), and
consequently most commentators on Deutsch’s work (e. g. Barnum et al 2000;
Gill 2003; Lewis 2003) have claimed that he is guilty of a non sequitur at various
points in his derivation. In fact (as I argued in Wallace 2003b) he is guilty of
no such thing.
The central insight of Deutsch’s argument is that when measurement pro-
cesses are represented physically there can be no unambiguous way to assign
triples 〈H, |ψ〉 , X̂〉 to these physical processes. Hence, one and the same process
may be validly represented by two triples — and if so, of course, the relation 
should not distinguish between those triples.
How does the ambiguity arise? For one thing, the physical process of prepar-
ing a state and then measuring an observable on it consists of a large number
of unitary transformations applied to the state and to various auxiliary systems
and there is no privileged moment at which the preparation phase can be said to
have finished and the measurement phase begun; nor is there any privileged way
of saying which system is the one being measured and which is the ‘auxiliary’
system.
Consider, for instance, the Stern-Gerlach experiment (see, for instance, Feyn-
man, Leighton, and Sands (1965) for an elementary discussion). A beam of
particles prepared in some spin state is placed in an inhomogeneous magnetic
field in the +z direction, with the result that particles with spin up (in the z
direction) are deflected in one direction and particles of spin down in another.
The outgoing beams are incident on some detector which records the location
of each particle.
The Stern-Gerlach device is generally treated as a paradigmatic measure-
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ment of particle spin — in this case along the z axis. Now suppose that we wish
to apply that measurement to particles in spin state |+x〉 = 1√2 (|+z〉 + |−z〉),
but our preparation device only outputs spin state |+z〉. There is an easy rem-
edy: after the particles emerge from the preparation device, expose them to a
homogenous magnetic field which causes their spins to precess, taking |+z〉 to
the desired state |+x〉. Effectively, the new magnetic field is just an extra part
of the preparation device.
Conversely, suppose that we want to measure the spin along the −x axis but
that it is too difficult physically to rotate the Stern-Gerlach apparatus. Again
there is a simple solution: instead of rotating the apparatus, rotate the particles
by exposing them to the same magnetic field. That magnetic field is effectively
just part of the measurement device.
However, from a purely physical viewpoint there is no difference at all be-
tween these two processes. In each case, we prepare particles in state |+z〉,
expose them to a magnetic field, and then insert them into a Stern-Gerlach de-
vice aligned along the +z axis. In the one case we have regarded the magnetic
field as part of the preparation, in the other case as part of the measurement
— but since this difference is purely a matter of convention and does not cor-
respond to any physical difference, it should be regarded as irrelevant to the
subjective likelihood of detecting given results.
In fact, we can go further than this: it is also only a matter of convention
that we take the process to be a measurement of spin and not of position.
For although we have described the splitting of the beam into two as part of
the measurement process, it could equally well be regarded as part of a state
preparation — in this case, to prepare a particle in a coherent superposition of
two positions.4
The moral of this example is as follows: any process which we describe as
‘prepare a state, then measure it’ actually consists of a long sequence of unitary
transformations on a wide variety of quantum systems (for instance, the magnet
performs a unitary transformation on the spin space of the particle, and then
the Stern-Gerlach apparatus performs another on the joint spin-position space of
the particle). As it is purely conventional when these transformations stop being
part of the state preparation and start being part of the measurement process,
probabilistic statements about that process cannot depend on that convention.
Symbolically, this is to say that there will be some processes which are equally
well described by 〈H, |ψ〉 , X̂〉 and by 〈H′, Û |ψ〉 , X̂ ′〉 where Û : H → H′ is a
unitary transformation and ÛX̂ = X̂
′
Û . We can write this as
〈E,H, |ψ〉 , X̂〉 ∼ 〈E,H′, |ψ′〉 , X̂ ′〉, (3)
which is to be read as ‘there is some physical process represented both as a
4Technically the particles are actually in an entangled state, since their spin remains cor-
related with their position; the important point remains that the observable being measured
could be taken to be a joint spin-position observable, rather than a pure spin observable. (In
any case, removing this entanglement in the Stern-Gerlach measurement process would be
technically possible, albeit rather difficult in practice.)
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measurement of X̂ on |ψ〉 followed by a bet on E, and as a measurement of X̂ ′
on |ψ′〉 followed by a bet on E.’
Similarly, the physical process of reading off the result of a measurement
from the apparatus involves both the physical state of the apparatus and some
convention as to which number is associated with which physical state — even
if the device has a needle pointing to the symbol “6” then it is a human con-
vention and not a law of physics that associates that symbol with the sixth
positive integer. But if so, then it is purely a matter of convention whether a
measurement of X̂ which obtained result x should actually be regarded as a
measurement of f(X̂) which obtained result f(x).
Again, conventions should not affect our judgements about likelihood, if they
do not correspond to anything physical. As such, it follows that
〈E,H, |ψ〉 , X̂〉 ∼ 〈f(E),H, |ψ〉 , f(X̂)〉 (4)
for arbitrary f .
From (3) and (4) we can establish equivalence. For if we take f(x) = 0
whenever x ∈ E and f(x) = 1 otherwise, it follows from (4) it follows that if
M is represented by the quadruple 〈E,H, |ψ〉 , X̂〉 then that quadruple is ∼-
equivalent to one of form 〈{0},H, |ψ〉 , X̂0, 〉, where X̂0 has only 0 and 1 as
eigenvalues.
Now let H0 be a fixed two-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by vectors |0〉
and |1〉. There will exist some unitary operator Û from H0 to H which takes
|0〉 to the 0-eigenspace of X̂ and |0〉 to the 1−eigenspace of X̂. This operator
satisfies Û |1〉 〈1| = X̂Û ; from (3) it then follows that 〈{0},H, |ψ〉 , X̂0, 〉 is ∼-
equivalent to
〈{0},H0, c |0〉+ d |1〉 , |1〉 〈1|〉, (5)
where c2 = WM (E) and c, d > 0. So ∼-equivalence classes are characterised
entirely by the weights they give to events.5
So: measurement neutrality is sufficient to establish the quantum proba-
bility theorem, given our physical definition of measurement.6 Furthermore, the
assumption is innocuous on its face: it is part of the basic structure of quantum
mechanics that measurement processes are specified up to irrelevant details once
we know what observable and state are to be measured.
Unfortunately, that innocuousness is somewhat misleading. The reasons why
we treat the state/observable description as complete are not independent of
the quantum probability rule. On the contrary, a standard argument might go:
“the probability of any given outcome from a measurement process is specified
completely by state and observable, so two different systems each described by
5For a slightly more detailed version of this argument (in a mildly different notation) see
Wallace (2003b).
6It is perhaps worth noting that Deutsch himself does not derive equivalence directly
from measurement neutrality, but rather uses the latter to derive a number of special
cases of equivalence which are sufficient to prove his own form of the quantum representation
theorem. See Wallace (2003b) for more details.
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the same state/observable pair will give the same statistics on measurement.”
Of course, such a justification is in danger of circularity in the present context.
In fact, it is possible to argue that from an Everettian (or indeed a collapse-
theoretic) viewpoint, “measurements” are a misnamed and even unnatural cat-
egory of processes. For traditionally the point of “measurement” is to learn
something, whereas all that happens when we “measure” an already-known
state in Everettian quantum mechanics is that we induce a certain decoherent
process (and all that happens in collapse-theoretic quantum mechanics is that
we trigger the collapse mechanism). In the betting scenarios that are the topic
of this paper, in fact, there is in a sense nothing to learn: ex hypothesi the state
is already known with certainty.
If ‘measurements’ are an unnatural category, measurement neutrality
seems to be unmotivated: it’s only decision-theoretically relevant that two pro-
cesses fall under the same description if we have reason to believe that that
description captures everything decision-theoretically relevant. As such, it is
tempting to abandon measurement neutrality altogether, and look for a
more direct justification of equivalence; indeed, that will be my strategy in
the next section. However, I remain unconvinced thatmeasurement neutral-
ity is so unmotivated even for an Everettian. For one thing, something seems
wrong about the previous paragraph’s attack on ‘measurements’. It certainly
fails to be an accurate description of real physicists’ modus operandi : the ex-
perimentalist building (say) a cloud chamber believes himself designing a device
that will detect particles, not one which induces decoherence, and the design
principles he employs are selected accordingly.
This is, I think, one point where the OD and SU viewpoints on branching
(discussed in section 2) lead to different results. The supporter of the OD
viewpoint will be prepared to bite the bullet and say that ‘real physicists’ are
profoundly mistaken about what ‘measurement devices’ are (just as all of us are
profoundly mistaken in regarding measurement results as uncertain.) From the
OD perspective, I think, measurement neutrality has no available defence
and it is necessary to look directly for justifications of equivalence.
Is it defensible for an advocate of the SU viewpoint? As I discuss in Wal-
lace 2003b, they will agree with Dirac and von Neumann that a measurement
device performs two functions: it induces wave-function collapse of the state
being measured into some eigenstate of the observable being measured, and it
then evolves deterministically into a state indicating the eigenvalue of that state.
But, unlike Dirac and von Neumann, they will not find this dual function mys-
terious. For an Everettian, the wave-function collapse is only “effective” and
“phenomenological”. More precisely, the branching structure of the universe
(which in turn defines “effective collapse”) is defined pragmatically, in terms
of which structure(s) are explanatorily and predictively most useful (I defend
this view in Wallace 2003a). The very fact that the measurement process is
going to occur, and that it will rapidly lead to decoherence between the various
output states of the measurement device, guarantees that the explanatorily and
predictively natural branching structure to choose is one in which each branch
finds the system being measured in an eigenstate.
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Thus, from the SU viewpoint there seems (I go no further than this) to be
an important sense in which “measuring devices” really do deserve that name,
and hence in which measurement neutrality is indeed innocuous.
8 Equivalence, directly
Perhaps the reader is inclined towards the OD viewpoint; or perhaps s/he is
unconvinced by the SU-dependent defence of measurement neutrality which
I offered above. Either way, it seems worth looking directly at equivalence, to
see if it can be justified without recourse tomeasurement neutrality. This is
also of interest because it allows a direct reply to those critics of Deutsch (such
as Lewis 2003) who argue that there can be no decision-theoretic reason to be
indifferent between choices that lead to very different branching structures, even
if they give the same quantum-mechanical weight to a given outcome.
The defence that I wish to offer will take different forms from the SU and
OD viewpoints, but it is possible to establish a framework common to both.
Consider a simple example: some measuring device has two possible outputs
(call them “heads” and “tails”), and some agent prefers a bet on heads to one
on tails.
The actual physical situation is then something like this: inside the device,
the system being measured is prepared in a superposition of states of whatever
basis the device measures. That system then gets entangled with the innards
of the device; the entanglement ramifies up first to the whole device, then to
the agent and the rest of the device’s immediate surroundings, and ultimately
to a large fraction of the Universe: decoherence. At the end of this process,
the agent has been replaced by many copies — due to inevitable noise in the
measurement and decoherence process there will not be just two copies, but a
vast (possibly infinite, and probably indeterminate) number, each differing in
microscopic ways but each observing either “heads” or “tails”. (See my (2003a)
for a more detailed discussion of this multiplication of structure on branching.)
The ones who get heads then get rewarded, of course.
The question is: what variations in this situation would or would not affect
the agent’s choice? We can identify 5 different ways in which the situation might
be varied (this is intended to be an exhaustive list):
1. The terms of the bet(s) might vary: maybe the payoff is undesirable, for
instance; or maybe the bet on tails is bigger than that on heads.
2. Further rewards and punishments might be given, dependent on the micro-
details of the outcome process: maybe, for instance, in addition to the
fixed bet, if a certain cubic micron of the device happens to have tem-
perature between 300 K and 300 + 10−10 K then the agent is poisoned.
Equivalently, the details of the measurement process might be varied in
ways that lead to outcomes that the agent finds more or less desirable:
maybe certain of the outcome states that display “heads” also cause the
device to emit poison gas.
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3. The details of the device’s outcome states are varied, but in some way
to which the observer is indifferent: maybe the word “heads” appears in
12-point green letters rather than 10-point white ones, for instance.
4. The total quantum-mechanical weight of all “heads” outcomes is increased
or decreased.
5. The weights of “heads” and “tails” are kept fixed, but what might be called
the “branching microstructure” is varied: that is, the number of copies
who observe heads and tails is varied, and/or their branching histories
are varied, so that (for instance) instead of the agent branching into 100
copies who see heads and 50 who see tails, he branches into 50 who see
heads and 50 who see tails.
Of these, (1) and (2) are fairly obviously relevant to an agent’s choice —
which is perfectly compatible with the decision theory advanced earlier, and
with my proof of the quantum representation theorem. What about (3), whose
irrelevance is necessary for equivalence to hold? Well, from the SU viewpoint
the irrelevance of (3) is an immediate consequence of decision theory: the ques-
tion of whether a variation of kind (3) is decision-theoretically relevant could
be paraphrased as: ‘do you care if we make some changes to possible outcomes
that you don’t care about’. The answer is trivially “no”, so variations of (3) are
irrelevant, as equivalence requires. It is only slightly less trivial from the OD
viewpoint: there the paraphrase is: ‘do you care if we alter your descendant’s
environments in ways that they don’t care about’, and a negative answer is
rationally required.7
(4), of course, had better not turn out to be irrelevant. I admit that I don’t
know of any good intuitive argument why an agent should care about weights
— but the point is of course that none is needed. The fact that an agent regards
high-weight events as more probable than low-weight ones is a consequence of
the quantum representation theorem, not a premise.
This leaves (5) — if it can be established that (5) is irrelevant to decision-
making, then (on the assumption that (1)–(5) are exhaustive, as I have claimed)
equivalence holds and the quantum representation theorem follows. However,
the irrelevance of (5) is not at all obvious: indeed, in conversation I have found
that it tends to be the main objection raised to an Everettian theory of proba-
bility. If I have 100 descendants who see heads and only 1 who sees tails (goes
the argument), then surely I should bet on heads rather than tails, and weights
be damned.
My final task in this paper, then, is to argue that Everettians have an answer
to this. Indeed, they have two, though the first works only from the SU view-
point. From that viewpoint, recall, branching events are to be understood (from
7In case this is not obvious, recall that the OD approach constructs our attitude to branch-
ing along Parfittian lines: we care about our multiple future descendants in case of branching
for the same reasons that we care about our ‘normal’ descendants in non-branching cases.
In the latter case, and therefore the former, we are indifferent to anything to which our
descendant(s) will themselves be indifferent.
17
the agent’s viewpoint) as cases of subjective uncertainty : the agent should expect
to experience one or other outcome, but does not (and cannot) know which.
But in this case, it is easy to see that the agent should be indifferent to
branching per se. Suppose that someone proposes to increase a million-fold the
number of the agent’s descendants who see heads: say, by hiding within the
measurement device a randomizer that generates and displays a number from
one to 1 million, but whose output the agent doesn’t care about and probably
never sees. Then from the SU viewpoint, this just corresponds to introducing
some completely irrelevant extra uncertainty. For it is the central premise of the
SU viewpoint that process which from an objective standpoint involves branch-
ing, should be described subjectively as simply one with uncertain outcomes. In
this case the objective description is “the agent branches into a million copies
who see heads, and one copy who sees tails”; the correct description for the
agent himself is “I will either see heads or tails, and I am uncertain as to which;
if I see heads then I am further uncertain about the result of the randomiser
reading — but I don’t care about that reading”.
But it is a (trivially) provable result of decision theory that introducing
“irrelevant” uncertainty of this kind is indeed irrelevant (it is essentially the
statement that if we divide one possible outcome into equally-valuable subout-
comes, that division is not decision-theoretically relevant). As such, from the
SU viewpoint variations of kind (5) can be discounted.
(Of course, a critic may deny that the observer’s description really is correct
— but this is simply another way to reject the SU viewpoint itself.)
An adherent of the OD viewpoint cannot resort to this strategy, but they
can resort to the other answer available to the Everettian (which is also available
from the SU viewpoint) It is a somewhat surprising answer: notwithstanding
the last few paragraphs, the so-called “branching microstructure” is a myth;
there is actually no such thing.
Why? Because the models of splitting often considered in discussions of Ev-
erett — usually involving two or three discrete splitting events, each producing
in turn a smallish number of branches — bear little or no resemblance to the
true complexity of realistic, macroscopic quantum systems. In reality:
• Realistic models of macroscopic systems are invariably infinite-dimensional,
ruling out any possibility of counting the number of discrete descendants.
• In such models the decoherence basis is usually a continuous, over-complete
basis (such as a coherent-state basis8 rather than a discrete one, and the
very idea of a discretely-branching tree may be inappropriate. (I am grate-
ful to Simon Saunders for these observations).
• Similarly, the process of decoherence is ongoing: branching does not occur
at discrete loci, rather it is a continual process of divergence.
• Even setting aside infinite-dimensional problems, the only available method
of ‘counting’ descendants is to look at the time-evolved state vector’s over-
8See, for instance, (Zurek, Habib, and Paz 1993).
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lap with the subspaces that make up the (decoherence-) preferred basis:
when there is non-zero overlap with one of these subspaces, I have a de-
scendant in the macrostate corresponding to that subspace. But the de-
coherence basis is far from being precisely determined, and in particular
exactly how coarse-grained it is depends sensitively on exactly how much
interference we are prepared to tolerate between ‘decohered’ branches. If
I decide that an overlap of 10−10
10
is too much and change my basis so as
to get it down to 0.9× 10−1010 , my decision will have dramatic effects on
the “head-count” of my descendants.
• Just as the coarse-graining of the decoherence basis is not precisely fixed,
nor is its position in Hilbert space. Rotating it by an angle of 10 degrees
will of coarse completely destroy decoherence, but rotating it by an angle
of 10−10
10
degrees assuredly will not. Yet the number of my descendants is
a discontinuous function of that angle; a judiciously chosen rotation may
have dramatic effects on it.
• Branching is not something confined to measurement processes. The inter-
action of decoherence with classical chaos guarantees that it is completely
ubiquitous: even if I don’t bother to turn on the device, I will still undergo
myriad branching while I sit in front of it. (See Wallace (2001, section 4)
for a more detailed discussion of this point.)
The point here is not that there is no precise way to define the number of de-
scendants; the entire decoherence-based approach to the preferred-basis problem
turns (as I argue in (Wallace 2003a)) upon the assumption that exact precision
is not required. Rather, the point is that there is not even an approximate way
to make such a definition.
This objection can be given both an epistemic and an ontic form. The epis-
temic form is that whatever scheme is chosen to define number of descendants,
no physically realised agents have the slightest hope of being able to learn those
numbers, given how wildly they will depend on the most microscopic details of
their situation. (By contrast, the weight of a macroscopic outcome is usually
pretty robust under fluctuations in such details — even in a classically chaotic
system.) But if the number of descendants is no better than a wild guess, no
rational decision-making scheme should depend upon it.
The ontic form of the objection is that, absent even a vaguely robust defini-
tion for number of descendants, there is just no such thing. In the terminology
of Wallace (2003a), the arbitrariness of any proposed definition of number of
descendants makes such a definition neither predictive nor explanatory of any
detail of the quantum state’s evolution, and so no such definition should be
treated as part of macroscopic reality. (By contrast, the macroscopic structure
defined by decoherence (which can be specified by how the weights of a fam-
ily of coarse-grained projectors in the decoherence basis change over time) is
fairly robust, and so should be treated as real. It is only when we start probing
that structure to ridiculously high precision — as we must do in order to count
descendants — that it breaks down.)
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So: both the SU-viewpoint Everettian and her OD counterpart are in a posi-
tion to argue that rational agents care only about variations (1), (2) and (4). If
we then consider two games where the bets are kept fixed (thus preventing vari-
ations of types (1) and (2) ) and where the weight of the winning outcome is the
same in each game (thus preventing variations of type (4) ) then equivalence
follows, and with it the quantum representation theorem.
9 Conclusion
In Wallace (2003b), I identified four assumptions which I claimed (and still
claim!) are required for Deutsch’s proof of the probability rule to go through:
the Everett interpretation, the subjective-uncertainty viewpoint on that in-
terpretation, measurement neutrality, and a “fairly strong set of decision-
theoretic axioms”. I also argued that measurement neutrality was at least
plausibly a consequence of the SU viewpoint (using roughly the argument of
(the current paper’s) section 7.)
The present paper may be seen as an exploration of the extent to which
these assumptions can or cannot be weakened. We have found the following:
• Despite the substantial reformulation of Deutsch’s proof described above,
the Everett interpretation remains crucial: as section 6 argued, the central
assumption of my reformulation (equivalence) is just as dependent on the
Everettian assumption as is Deutsch’s own proof. Furthermore, there is no
realistic prospect of any decision-theoretic proof which applies to (realist)
interpretations other than Everett’s: all such proofs will inevitably end
up requiring us to be indifferent to which outcome is actually going to
occur, which is absurd in any single-universe interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
• Measurement neutrality per se need not be taken as a premise of the
argument. As was argued in section 8, it is possible to defend equivalence
directly, without recourse to measurement neutrality.
• The SU viewpoint is required in Deutsch’s proof (I have argued) both
to defend measurement neutrality and to justify the applicability of
decision theory. However, the decision-theoretic axioms which I have ad-
vanced have extremely natural justifications from the perspective of the
OD viewpoint, and section 8 shows how someone who holds that view-
point can defend equivalence directly. So it seems that we are not forced
to adopt the SU viewpoint, at least not in order to prove the probability
rule.
• Deutsch’s decision-theoretic axioms are far stronger than is strictly neces-
sary. The notion of a minimally rational preference ordering discussed in
section 4 is much weaker, yet still sufficiently strong to derive the quantum
representation theorem. Hence, criticisms of Deutsch’s program based on
the specifics of his decision theory appear to be beside the point.
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Given the enormous contribution that decoherence theory has made to the
problem of defining a preferred basis, quantitative probability is arguably the
last major obstacle confronting the Everett interpretation. In my view the ev-
idence is now quite strong that the decision-theoretic strategy which Deutsch
suggested is able to solve the problem; if so, the significance for Everett’s pro-
gram is hard to overstate.
Acknowledgements
For useful conversations and detailed feedback at various points over the evo-
lution of this paper, I would like to thank Harvey Brown, Adam Elga, Hilary
Greaves, Peter Lewis, David Papineau, and especially Jeremy Butterfield and
Simon Saunders.
References
Albert, D. and B. Loewer (1988). Interpreting the Many Worlds Interpreta-
tion. Synthese 77, 195–213.
Barnum, H., C. M. Caves, J. Finkelstein, C. A. Fuchs, and R. Schack
(2000). Quantum Probability from Decision Theory? Proceedings of
the Royal Society of London A456, 1175–1182. Available online at
http://www.arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9907024.
Barrett, J. (1999). The quantum mechanics of minds and worlds. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bell, J. S. (1981). Quantum Mechanics for Cosmologists. In C. J. Isham,
R. Penrose, and D. Sciama (Eds.), Quantum Gravity 2: a second Oxford
Symposium, Oxford. Clarendon Press. Reprinted in Bell (1987).
Bell, J. S. (1987). Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bostrom, N. (2002). Anthropic bias: observation selection effects in science
and philosophy. New York: Routledge.
Butterfield, J. (1996). Whither the Minds? British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science 47, 200–221.
de Finetti, B. (1974). Theory of Probability. New York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc,.
Deutsch, D. (1985). Quantum Theory as a Universal Physical Theory. Inter-
national Journal of Theoretical Physics 24 (1), 1–41.
Deutsch, D. (1999). Quantum Theory of Probability and Decisions. Proceed-
ings of the Royal Society of London A455, 3129–3137. Available online at
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9906015.
DeWitt, B. (1970). Quantum Mechanics and Reality. Physics Today 23 (9),
30–35. Reprinted in (DeWitt and Graham 1973).
21
DeWitt, B. and N. Graham (Eds.) (1973). The many-worlds interpretation of
quantum mechanics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Farhi, E., J. Goldstone, and S. Gutmann. How probability arises in quantum-
mechanics. Annals of Physics.
Feynman, R., R. B. Leighton, and M. L. Sands (1965). The Feynman Lectures
on Physics, Volume 3. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.
Fishburn, P. C. (1981). Subjective expected utility: A review of normative
theories. Theory and Decision 13, 139–99.
Fuchs, C. and A. Peres (2000). Quantum theory needs no “interpretation”.
Physics Today 53 (3), 70–71.
Ga¨rdenfors, P. and N.-E. Sahlin (Eds.) (1988). Decision, Probability and Util-
ity: Selected Readings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gell-Mann, M. and J. B. Hartle (1990). Quantum Mechanics in the Light of
Quantum Cosmology. In W. H. Zurek (Ed.), Complexity, Entropy and the
Physics of Information, pp. 425–459. Redwood City, California: Addison-
Wesley.
Gill, R. D. (2003). On an argument of David Deutsch. Available online from
http://xxx.arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0307188.
Greaves, H. (2003). Understanding Deutsch’s probability in a
deterministic multiverse. Forthcoming; available online at
http://xxx.arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 or from http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu.
Hartle, J. (1968). Quantum Mechanics of Individual Systems. American Jour-
nal of Physics 36, 704–712.
Lewis, P. (2003). Deutsch on quantum decision theory. Available online from
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu.
Papineau, D. (1996). Many Minds are No Worse than One. British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 47, 233–241.
Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ramsey, F. P. (1931). Truth and probability. In The Foundations of Mathe-
matics and Other Logical Essays, R. B.Braithwaite (ed. ) (Routledge and
Kegan Paul, London) pp. 156–198; reprinted in (Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin
1988), pp. 19–47.
Saunders, S. (1998). Time, Quantum Mechanics, and Probability. Syn-
these 114, 373–404.
Saunders, S. (2003). Derivation of the Born rule from operational as-
sumptions. Forthcoming in Proceedings of the Royal Society of London.
Available online at http://xxx.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0211138 or from
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu.
Savage, L. J. (1972). The foundations of statistics (2nd edition ed.). New
York: Dover.
22
Wallace, D. (2001). Implications of Quantum Theory in the Founda-
tions of Statistical Mechanics. Available online from http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu.
Wallace, D. (2002a). Quantum Probability and Decision Theory, Revis-
ited. Available online from http://www.arXiv.org or from http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu.
Wallace, D. (2002b). Worlds in the Everett Interpretation. Studies in the
History and Philosopy of Modern Physics 33, 637–661. Available online
at http://xxx.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0103092 or from http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu.
Wallace, D. (2003a). Everett and Structure. Studies in the History
and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34, 87–105. Available online
at http://xxx.arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0107144 or from http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu.
Wallace, D. (2003b). Everettian rationality: defending Deutsch’s ap-
proach to probability in the Everett interpretation. Studies in the His-
tory and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34, 415–439. Available online
at http://xxx.arXiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0303050 or from http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu.
Zurek, W. H., S. Habib, and J. P. Paz (1993). Coherent states via decoherence.
Physical Review Letters 70, 1187–1190.
23
